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Justifying the Principle of Distributive
Deviation in the Law of Trusts
By PAUL G. HAsxEL*
Introduction
IT ig a trtism that in our legal system private property rights are
relative. The essence of private property is the protection afforded
by the state with respect'to .the use and disposition of the subject of
property, as- qualified by the limitations imposed by 'the state in
accordance with various societal needs.i Certainly most would agree
that the existence of private property is justifiable only n socially
functional terms, as are the limitations placed thereon. -
If the system of land ownership established by William the Con-
queror is posited as the beginning of our Anglo-American law of
property, then our concept of private property has from its origin
been qualified in the interest of economic and social stability By
virtue of the conquest, title to the land of the realm was deemed
vested in the king who proceeded- to parcel it out among the respon-
sible and the loyal m exchange'for which military or sometimes other
forms of aid were to be furmished to the crown as a continuing obliga-
tion for the indefinite future. Those who held immediately of the
king proceeded similarly to submfeudate portions of their land to
others in exchange for economic, military or other services, and so
on down the feudal pyramid. In time the traditional incidents flowing
from tenant to lord came to be of greater economic significance than
the services which had originally been agreed to. It could be said that
land "ownership" m the feudal pyramid was conditional; one was
entitled to exploit the land as an "owner" so long as his dues were
paid to the king or other lord.
* Professor of Law, Georgetown Umversity Law Center.
i For the purposes of this mtroducti6n, a one sentence definition of this complex
subject seems adequate. This sentence is intended to embrace the future interest and
the equitable interest. For discussions of the nature of "property," see 1 Pow L, EEAL
PRos'naT j[ 6-15 (1949); Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property, 9 RurTGEs L. llv.
357 (1954); Philbnck, Changing Conceptions of Property in Law, 86 U. PA. L. Ev.
691 (1938); Pound, The Law of Property and Recent Jurutic Thought, 25 A.B.A.J. 993
(1939); Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
2 For discussions of the economic and military significance of the feudal landholding
system, see BEnciN & HAS'ELL, PnrFACE T O EsTATs 3x LAND Azzo FuTurE INTEREsTs
1-20 (1966); Pucmrmrr, A CONCISE HIsToRY oF -=n CommoN LAw 505-45 (5th ed.
1956); 1 POWELL, RAL PaoN xTy 16-33.
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We no longer have feudal services or incidents, but we do have
real estate taxes upon the payment of which the use of land is con-
ditioned. But today, more significantly, land ownership is qualified
by zoning laws, building codes, anti-discrmination legislation, and the
power of condemnation for a variety of public purposes. Obviously
the most significant qualifications upon property rights arise today in
the context of commerce. The multifarious methods of control range
from licensing, usury and Sunday-closing, to highly sophisticated
forms of regulation such as anti-trust laws, Federal Reserve monetary
control, and securities regulation. Possibly the graduated income tax
represents the most onerous limitation upon private property
The other principal aspect of private property, the right of dis-
position, also has a history of limitation in our legal- tradition. In 1290,
in the interest of economic stability, the Statute Quia Emptores
generally eliminated the landowner's right to alienate by submfeuda-
tion. The doctrine of the worther title and Shelley's Rule constituted
limitations upon the dispositive power in the interest of preserving
feudal incidents. The right to dispose of legal interests in land by will
was not generally recognized until 1540. The rights of dower and
curtesy, constituted a limitation upon the landowner's capacity to
transfer his title. Although dower and curtesy are still with us in a
number of jurisdictions, today the principal limitation upon testamen-
tary freedom.is. the surviving spouse's forced share, a. product of
relatively modern American legislation. In addition to restraints upon
dispositive freedom for purposes of family protection, our legal system
has developed a cumbersome method of limiting the duration of the
"dead hand" control in the form of the Rule Against Perpetuities. The
rationale for this rule seems to be that it is socially and economically
undesirable to permit an individual to effect control of the enjoyment
and investment of wealth for an extended period of time following his
death.
The dispositive power is also limited in favor of creditors by means
of the doctrine of the fraudulent conveyance and the priority given
creditors over beneficiaries in the administration of decedents' estates.
It should also be noted that gift and estate taxation constitues a
significant limitation upon dispositive freedom.3
Ths sketchy discussion of the qualified nature of private property,
8The dispositive power is, of course, restricted in other ways, such as limitations
upon gifts to charities in certain jurisdictions, the invalidity of certain conditions in
trusts considered to be contrary to public policy, the invalidity of certain direct restraints
upon alienation, and the so-called "pretermitted hei" statutes.
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winch may well be a belaboring of the obvious, is by way of back-
ground for consideration of the generally rigid nature of the law with
respect to deviation from distributive terms of trusts. The problem
with which this article is concerned can best be introduced by the
presentation of a specific fact situation: Testator, a widower, be-
queaths his entire estate m trust to pay the net income to his daughter,
who is his only child, for life, and upon her death, to pay over the
principal to her issue then living per stirpes, or if there are no such
issue, to the issue then living of the testator's deceased brother, or if
there are none, to XYZ Umversity for undergraduate scholarship pur-
poses.
Testator's net estate is 100,000 dollars. At the time of the testator's
death, the daughter is twenty-seven, married, and the mother of three
children. The husband is a junior bank officer earning 12,000 dollars
per year. Two years after the testator's death, the daughter's husband
is killed in an accident and is survived by his wife and the three chil-
dren. The husband's assets are 15,000 dollars in life insurance payable
to his widow, and an equity of 8,000 dollars in the family home. The
testator's daughter has certain psychological problems and has been
treated by a psychiatrist for several years at considerable expense,
which treatment should be continued. She cannot earn any money be-
cause of the attention she must give her children, whose ages are four,
three and- two. She finds it impossible to live in accordance with her
customary middle-class standard on the income from the trust and
social security benefits; the life insurance will be consumed in about
three years. She feels that if she could obtain 5,000 dollars from the
trust principal each year until such time as she is able to maintain a
job, she would be able to make ends meet. She probably will be able
to maintain a job when her youngest child is eleven or twelve.
The issue of the testator's deceased brother are, at the time of the
daughter's husband's death, two sons and three grandchildren who are
the children of one of the sons. The sons are in their early thirties, and
are both successful businessmen with incomes in excess of 20,000
dollars. XYZ Umversity is one of the wealthiest institutions in the
nation, with an endowment in the area of 400 million dollars.
In most jurisdictions, the law would afford no relief to the testator's
daughter. The testators dispositive plan is to be respected no matter
how harsh the consequences. There can be no deviation from the
distributive terms of the trust, without the consent of all those bene-
ficially interested.' This article will discuss some of the leading cases
4 E.g., Estate of Van Deusen, 30 Cal. 2d 285, 182 P.2d 565 (1947); Staley v. Ligon,
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and the statutes which deal with this problem, and attempt to evaluate
critically the state of the law
It should be stressed that this article does not deal with distribu-
tive deviation where the beneficially interested consent. For example,
assume the trust provides for the payment of income to the beneficiary
until he reaches age thirty, at which time one-half the principal is to
be distributed to him, and for the payment of income to the bene-
ficiary from the remaining trust corpus until he reaches age forty, at
which time the remainder of the principal is to be paid to him. If the
beneficiary should die under the age of forty, the principal then un-
distributed is to be paid to hIs estate. At age twenty-six, beneficiary is
in dire need of more funds, for reasons of health, or family support.
There is substantial authority for the proposition that the court may in
these circumstances direct the trustee to advance a portion of the
principal.5 This certainly is deviation from the distributive terms of the
trust, but the beneficiary is the only interested person.
Of course, in certain circumstances all the remamdermen may join
with all the income beneficiaries to require the termination of the
trust in order to divide the corpus among them, but once again this
is a situation where all interested parties consent." Tins article is con-
cerned with distributive deviaton where all the interested parties do
not consent, or where potentially interested parties are not in being.
Distributive deviation should also be distinguished from admin-
istrative deviation. Let us assume the -trust instrument provides that
certain real estate is to be retained in trust and is not to be sold by the
239 Md. 61, 210 A.2d 384 (1965); In Re Trust under the Will of Cosgrave, 225 Minn.
443, 31 N.W.2d 20 (1948); Hughes v. Federal Trust Co., 119 N.J. Eq. 502, 183 At.
229 (1936). See BoCERT, TRusTs AND TRusTEEs § 561 (2d ed. 1960); 2 ScoTT,
TRUSTS § 168 (2d ed. 1956). See also cases cited in note 22 infra.
Obviously a provision in the will authorizing the distribution of principal for sup-
port or other needs would obviate the problem of distributive deviation.
5 First National Bank v. Watters, 220 Ala. 356, 125 So. 222 (1929); Elder v. Elder,
50 Me. 535 (1861); Bennett v. Nashville Trust Co., 127 Tenn. 126, 153 S.W 840
(1913). See Whittingham v. California Trust Co., 214 Cal. 128, 4 P.2d 142 (1931);
RESTATEmENT (SEcoND), TRUSTS § 168 (1959); 2 ScoTr, TriUsTs § 168 (2d ed. 1956).
Under the Claflin principle, discussed in note 6 nifra, such a trust would not ordinarily
be terminable in whole or in part by the sole beneficiary.
6 Under the principle established in the case of Claflin v. Claflin, 149 Mass. 19,
20 N.E. 454 (1889), all the beneficiaries cannot compel the termination of a trust if a
material purpose of the settlor in creating the trust would be defeated by such pre-
mature termination. The trust to pay the income to the beneficiary until he reaches a
certain age at which time principal is to be paid to hn, and the spendthrift trust, are
the primary examples of "material purpose" trusts. These are to be distinguished from
the trust which is created only for the purpose of providing successive enjoyment of the
property.
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trustee. It appears years later that the retention of the property is
imprudent because the income is inadequate for the purposes of the
trust. Courts have authorized deviation from the investment limitation
in a trust where the consequences of rigid compliance with the invest-
ment terms would be seriously adverse.7 There have also been inter-
esting cases in recent years in which the trust provided that only
designated debt securities were to constitute the trust investments,
and certain beneficiaries petitioned for directions to invest in part in
equity securities in order to maintain the value of the corpus in these
times of inflation." This article does not deal with the question of
deviation from administrative or investment terms of trusts; we are
concerned only with the issue of distributive deviation where the
property interests of the beneficiaries may be disturbed.
Present State of the Law
There has been a substantial amount of litigation in which the
question of the power of a court of equity, m the absence of statute,
to authorize or direct deviation from the distributive provisions of
trusts has been considered. In tis portion of the article several of the
leading cases will be discussed and the results critically assessed.
There will also be considered the statutes which have authorized
distributive deviation.
In Estate of Van Deusen,0 the Supreme Court of Califorma dealt
squarely with the issue of the power of a court of equity to order de-
viation from the distributive provisions of a trust. The testatrix died m
1944 leaving a will executed in 1932 in which the residue of her estate
was left m trust for the following purposes:
[T]o pay over the net mcome arsing therefrom, in equal shares, unto
my aforesaid daughters, Gladys Van Deusen Bright and Hazel Van
Deusen Lee, dunng the period of their joint lives, and in case of the
death of either of them, then all of said net income unto the survivor,
for and during the natural life of the survivor. Upon the death of the
survivor of my said daughters, this trust shall finally cease and de-
7 See Second Ecclesiastical Soe'y v. Attorney General, 133 Conn. 89, 48 A.2d 266
(1946); Carlick v. Keiler, 375 S.W.2d 397 (Ky. 1964); In the Matter of the Estate of
Pulitzer, 139 Misc. 575, 249 N.Y. Supp. 87 (Sur. Ct. 1931), a#'d mem., 237 App. Div.
808, 260 N.Y. Supp. 975 (1932); BESTATEMENT (SEcoND), TnusTs § 167 (1959).
8 Contrasting approaches to this question appear m the cases of Stanton v. Wells
Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co., 150 Cal. App. 2d 763, 310 P.2d 1010 (1957), in which
the deviation was denied, and In Re Trusteeslp under Agreement with Mayo, 259
Minn. 91, 105 N.W.2d 900 (1960), in which deviation was directed. See also Carlick v.
Keller, 375 S.W.2d 397 (Ky. 1964).
9 30 Cal. 2d 285, 182 P.2d 565 (1947).
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termme, and my trustee shall thereupon transfer, assign and pay over
the entire trust fund, including any undistributed income, absolutely
and in fee simple, in equal shares unto those of my grandchildren
who may then be living, the then surviving issue, however of any of
them who may then be dead, to take, per stirpes, the same part or
share the deceased ancestor would have taken if living.'
The testatrix was survived by the two life beneficiaries under the
trust, and several remamdermen, with the possibility of unborn re-
maindermen. The trust produced an income of not more than 250
dollars per month. The two life income beneficiaries petitioned the
probate court for directions to the trustee to pay each of them not
less than 200 dollars per month, in part from principal if the income
was insufficient. The probate court granted the petition stating,
that the main benefits under said trust were intended for the
petitioners herein who were the primary ob]ects of the testatnx's
solicitude and that the primary purpose of the trust could not be
accomplished by a strict adherence to the terms of the declaration of
the trust and that it is the purpose of said trust that the said peti-
tioners herein receive the sum of 200 dollars each per month.,.
The-trustee appealed.
It appeared that since the creation of the trust, that is, subsequent
to the testatri's death, one of the life beneficiaries had been afflicted
with a disease believed to be incurable and needed special medical
care, and the other was completely dependent upon the income from
the trust for the necessities of life. It further appeared that at the time
of the execution of the will in 1932 testatrix anticipated that the in-
come from the residuary trust would be 400 dollars per month. There
was also evidence introduced that in 1943, a year before the testatrix's
death, the testatrix was aware that the income from the residuary
trust would be substantially less than 400,dollars per month, and that
she intended to'-modify her will to provide more for her daughters, the
life beneficiaries. Testatrix never did make the necessary change in
her will. Although it is not clear, it appears from the statement of the
facts that the decline m the income was attributable to the decline
in the value and productivity of the testatrix's assets between 1932
and 1944, rather than to any substantial spending or inter vivos giving
by the testatrx.
In reversing the probate court, Justice Traynor, speaking for the
supreme court stated:
io Id. at 286, 182 P.2d at 568.
11 Id. at 288, 182 P.2d at 568-69.
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The only interest given respondents [life beneficiaries] is the net
income from the corpus. The grandchildren of the testatnx, children
of the respondents, are entitled to distribution of the corpus on the
death of the surviving respondent. To allow an invasion of the corpus
without the consent of the residuary beneficiaries contrary to the pro-
visions of the trust instrument is to take property from one without
his consent and give it to another.
Sympathy for the needs of the respondents does not empower the
court to deprive the residuary beneficiaries of their interests in the
corpus of the trust without their consent. If the courts could in-
crease the payments under testamentary trusts without the consent of
all the beneficiaries merely because the income therefrom is not what
it was at the time the will was executed and because at one time or
another the testator expressed the desire to provide adequately for
the beneficiaries, there would be no stability to any testamentary
trust in this state.12
The opinion of the court is certainly consistent with traditional
jurisprudence in the field of property Subject to qualifications not
relevant here,i" the property owner may dispose of his property as
he wishes; the will gave the daughters the -income and the daughters'
descendants the principal, and that's that. But it seemed that the
daughters were the principal objects of the testatrix's bounty. It is
clear that the daughter who had no other source of income was in dire
straits, and the other daughter who was incurably ill was apparently
in financial need. The decision certainly maintains the integrity of the
dispositive aspect of private property which seems a transcendent
value.
The concluding statement of Justice Traynor that if the probate
court decision were to be affirmed, there would be no stability in any
testamentary trust in the state of California, appears to be rather
extravagant. No one would suggest that courts play fast and loose
with testamentary provisions. An affirmance of the probate court de-
cision would only be precedent for distributive deviation where the
primary objects of the testator's bounty were not receiving basic sup-
port; it would be precedent only for this principle of most limited
application. Stability of property rights would only be disturbed
where a greater social value seemed to require it.
In the case of Bosler Estate,14 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
faced the issue of distributive deviation on facts which were most
12 Id. at 293-95, 182 P.2d at 571-73.
i3 This refers to dower, forced heirship, perpetuities, estate and gift taxation, credi-
tors rights, and the like.
14 378 Pa. 333, 107 A.2d 443 (1954).
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compelling. Testatrix's will established a spend-thrift trust of 20,000
dollars for her son, the petitioner, to pay the income to hun for his life,
and upon his death, the principal to his issue. In default of issue living
at his death, the son was to have a general power to appoint the corpus
by will, but if he failed to exercise the power, the corpus was to go to
the testatrix's other descendants then living. There were similar trusts
for two daughters which were not in issue in the case.
A clause in the will provided: I have made these three bequests
in trust, not from any lack of confidence m or affection for my said
two daughters and son, but in order that I may feel that I have made
provision for them which will assure to each one of them a support
throughout his or her whole life, under any circumstances, and for
the comfort that I will personally derive from such knowledge. 15
The son petitioned the lower court to decree the termination of his
trust. The court concluded that it could give partial relief to the son,
and accordingly ordered the trustee to pay the son 1200 dollars out of
the corpus immediately to meet present emergencies, and in addition
to the annual income, to pay 100 dollars quarterly out of corpus. The
trustee appealed the lower court's decision.
The son was sixty-five years old, married, had never had any chil-
dren and was incapable of having any He was an employee of the
United States Navy earning 150 dollars per month, and was about to
be retired. It was unlikely that he would be able to obtain any other
employment after retirement. The income from the trust was 650
dollars annually It was in light of these circumstances that the lower
court ordered the invasion of the corpus for the son's support.
The son contended that since he could not have issue, and since
he had a general testamentary power, he had, in effect, the sole bene-
ficial interest in the trust. Thus distribution of prncipal to him would
not constitute an inpairment of any other person's interest. The Su-
preme Court of Pennsylvania, however, reversed the decision of the
lower court.
The supreme court questioned whether the life interest plus the
general testamentary power gave the son the equivalent of an equi-
table fee. The court certainly was techincally accurate, since the
power might not be exercised; consequently the descendants of the
decedent alive at the son's death had interests In the trust. Presumably
the court could have denied the invasion of corpus on the basis that
the property rights of the remaindermen would be inpaired. How-
15 Id. at 335, 107 A.2d at 444.
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ever, the court chose to base its decision on the Claflin principle' 6
winch made the existence or non-existence of remainder interests ir-
relevant.
The reasoning of the court was that, based on the Claftin principle,
the termination of a testamentary trust, partial or total, will not be
ordered, even though all possible beneficially interested parties agree
to it, if the purpose of the testator in the establishment of the trust
has not been fully accomplished. The spendthrift trust has generally
been considered to be a "material purpose" trust,i7 and therefore not
subject to termination by consent of the beneficiaries.
The court minimized the significance of the clause in the will in
which the testatrix expressed her desire to take care of the support
requirements of her son. The court stated that the testatrx could
easily have protected against the changed circumstances of the income
beneficiary by authorizing the trustee, in its discretion, to distribute
principal to the life beneficiary if necessary for his support.
The court said that the purpose of the non-termination rule is to
effect the wishes of the settlor, and the desires or needs of the bene-
ficiaries are of no concern. The court justified the principle solely on
the basis of property rights of the deceased former owner, as mani-
fested in his dispositive provisions. This case contained the factors of
considerable need and the extremely remote possibility of impairment
of other property interests, but in the scale of values of the law the
property rights of the dead hand were of greater weight.
It should be noted that there is ample precedent for the deviation
from the terms of a trust where the sole income beneficiary is to re-
ceive the principal at a later date, and if he does not survive the time
of distribution the principal is to be paid to his estate. In this situa-
tion, there is only one beneficiary Courts have, on these facts, au-
thorized the premature distribution of principal where it appeared
necessary 18 Bosler Estate is not precisely this case, but it is very close.
In the recent case of Staley v. Ligon," the Court of Appeals of
Maryland was presented with a request for deviation and chose to
follow the course of giving literal effect to the income-principal dis-
tributive division in the will. The testator died in 1953, survived by
his widow and son, and leaving a will which disposed of his residuary
estate in trust as follows:
16 See note 6 supra.
17 3 ScoTt, TnusTs § 337.2 (2d ed. 1956).
18 See note 6 supra.
19 239 Md. 61, 210 A.2d 384 (1965).
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[Ulse the balance then remaining of the entire net income of the
said trust estate for the reasonable support and maintenance of
my beloved wife, Veryl W Ligon, and that the entire net income
then remaining of the said trust estate shall be paid to her so long as
she shall live; except that in the event my beloved wife shall become
mentally or physically incompetent, then the said Trustees may ac-
cumulate the income of the said trust estate herein created and pay
to my said wife such sum or sums- at such intervals as may, in the
opinion of the Trustees, be necessary for her health, welfare, comfort
and entertainment.20
Upon the death of the widow the income was to go to the testator's
son for life. Upon his death such income went to or for the use of the
issue of the son for stated periods of years after which they were to
receive the estate outright.
The testator's son died in 1955, survived by three children, all of
whom were minors at the time suit was brought. The widow peti-
tioned the trial court to instruct the trustee to invade corpus to the
extent necessary to provide an income to her of 1000 dollars per
month, which relief was granted. The trustee and the guardian ad
litem for the minor grandchildren appealed. The court of appeals
reversed.
The corpus of the trust consisted principally of real estate, the net
income from which was rather erratic. From 1953 to 1958 the trust
produced an income for the widow m an amount approaching
15,000 dollars per annum. Since 1958 the income had been very sub-
stantially reduced, and the payments to the widow during the year
preceding the litigation were 400 dollars per month. The corpus of
the trust was valued at 170,000 dollars at the time of the suit.
The only other source of income of the widow, who was seventy
at the time of suit, was social security Her living expenses were 600
dollars per month, excluding medical expenses. She was under the care
of a psychiatrist and had required shock treatments. Her medical
expenses were 2500 dollars m 1963, and in other years since 1955 the
medical expenses had ranged between 1000 and 2000 dollars. The
widow had lived a very comfortable life while her husband was alive;
she had had servants,, and had received from her husband 1000 dollars
per month to run the house.
The court of appeals recognized that the testator was concerned
with the care of his wife and had not anticipated a drastic reduction
m income, but the court did not consider that the widow was neces-
20 Id. at 63-64, 210 A.2d at 385-86.
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sarily the primary object of the testator's bounty It stated its position
on the question of distributive deviation as follows:
Inasmuch as the testator clearly gave the widow and the son and
the grandchildren a definite right for life or for years to the net in-
come of the estate and gave no right to corpus, express or implied,
to anyone other than the grandchildren, the court was without power
to order corpus to be given to the widow, for to do so would be to
give one cestin part of a fund which the testator gave to another,
without the consent of that other. This the decisions and the text
writers say cannot be done.21
Although the substantial weight of authority is opposed,22 there are
cases which have recognized the power of a court of equity to author-
ize or direct deviation from distributive provisions of trusts in appro-
priate circumstances. Probably the leading case is Petition of Wol-
cott,23 in which the Supreme Court of New Hampshire authorized
distribution of principal to the life income beneficiary contrary to the
express terms of the trust. Testator died in 1944 leaving a will executed
in 1932 in which the residuary estate was left in trust "to pay over the
net income thereof to my wife so long as she lives," and upon her
death to pay the principal "to my then living issue in equal shares by
right of representation, and, in default of such issue, to the persons to
whom and in the proportions in wich the same would be distribut-
able if I had then died intestate and owning such property abso-
lutely" 24 There were spendthrift provisions applicable to the re-
mainder interests. The will also granted the trustee broad investment
powers and discretion with respect to the determination of what
"receipts" were to be treated as income and what were to be treated
as principal.
The testator was survived by his widow, two sons, and an eighteen
year old grandson. The principal of the trust was about 107,000
21 Id. at 68, 210 A.2d at 388.
22 1n addition to the cases discussed above, see the following: Leonardim v. Wells
Fargo Biank & Union Trust Co., 131 Cal. App. 2d 9, 280 P.2d 81 (1955); Wogman v.
Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co., 123 Cal. App. 2d 657, 267 P.2d 423 (1954);
Mills v. Michigan Trust Co., 124 Mich. 244, 82 N.W 1046 (1900); In Re Trust Under
Will of Cosgrave, 225 Minn. 443, 31 N.W.2d 20 (1948); Thomson v. Union Nat'l Bank,
291 S.W.2d 178 (Mo. 1956); Segelken v. Segelken, 26 N.J. Super. 178, 97 A.2d 501
(1953); Hughes v. Federal Trust Co., 119 N.J. Eq. 502, 183 Atl. 299 (1936); Stewart
v. Hamilton, 151 Tenn. 396, 270 S.W 79 (1925); Estate of Boyle, 252 Wis. 511, 32
N.W.2d 333 (1948). See generally Annot., 1 A.L.R.2d 1323 (1948); BocaTr, TRusTs
AND Tausmas § 561 (2d ed. 1960); 2 ScOTT, TnusTS § 168 (2d ed. 1956); Note,
Dev ation From the Distributive Terms of the Trust, 53 Nw. U.L. Blv. 268 (1958).
2395 N.H. 23, 56 A.2d 641 (1948).
2- Id. at 24, 56 A.2d at 642.
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dollars, and the income was slightly in excess of 2300 dollars. The
widow was eighty-two, ill and infirm.
The trustees petitioned for instructions to distribute principal to
the widow, but the lower court referred the question of law to the
supreme court without ruling. The lower court found that the needs
of the widow exceeded 5800 dollars per year. The trustees asked that
they be authorized and instructed to invade principal to the extent of
up to 4000 dollars per year for the widow's support. The two sons
joined in the petition, and the guardian ad litem for the minor grand-
child and unborn remamdermen presented no objection. The supreme
court held that the trustees should be empowered to invade principal
as requested. The court reasoned as follows:
"Despite broad discretionary powers conferred upon the trustees,
the will contains no provision for the use of principal for the benefit
of the widow. On the other hand, such use is not specifically for-
bidden. It may fairly be assumed that the beneficiary's need of the
principal was not anticipated because of a failure to foresee changes
which have occurred since the testator's death, including shrinkage
in investment returns, decline in purchasing power, and the expense
occasioned by the widow's extreme infirmity The powers conferred
upon the trustees as to investments and the allocation of receipts to
income are indicative of a purpose to provide the widow with a
liberal income unrestricted by technical rules. No purpose to trans-
mit any specific residuary amount to the sons or to any other issue is
disclosed..
In the will before us, the testator's purpose to furnish reasonable
support for his wife is not expressed in words, but it is nevertheless
implicit in the disposition made of his estate. His direction that his
wife should have the income was a means of executing his purpose,
and is properly to be read as subordinate to his paramount pur-
pose. His intent to provide reasonable support to the widow
being evident from the will, those whose interests are secondary to
hers take subject to the execution of that intent. The remamdermen
are deprived of no rights so long as the rights which the life tenant
was intended to have are not exceeded.
Because of circumstances not provided for by the will and obvi-
ously not anticipated by the testator, an emergency threatens accom-
plishment of his purpose by the means which he provided. Those
whose interests are most immediate consent to the authorization
sought by the trustees, and there is no objection by the guardian ad
litem. If the consent or acquiescence of the parties is not binding
upon unborn contingent remaindermen, still they are sufficiently
represented by those having like interests to be bound by a decree.
In this situation a court of equity need not hesitate to exercise its
undoubted power to permit a deviation from the literal provisions of
the will. A means of accomplishing the testator's purpose is thereby
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furnished, which it may reasonably be inferred that he himself would
have provided, had he been able to foresee the exigency 25
Professor Austin W Scott seems to be favorably disposed to the
Wolcott decision. In his superb treatise on trust law,20 he generalizes
as follows:
Even though there is a gift over on the death of the beneficiary, the
court will authorize or direct an invasion of the principal for the
necessary support of the beneficiary where the will indicates that the
support of the beneficiary was the primary purpose of the testator,
even though the testator did not in express terms permit the invasion
of the principal.2
7
Scott discusses the Wolcott case m support of this proposition.
In a review of the second edition of the Scott treatise, 2  another
eminent authority, Professor Russell Niles, took issue with Professor
Scott's favorable attitude toward the doctrine of distributive deviation,
as follows:
Professor Scott would like to have the law developed in a more liberal
fashion and would like to have the court depart from the terms of the
trust to protect those who have the strongest claim on the testator,
even though the testator did not do what he should have done by ex-
press terms. Had the testator anticipated the plight of the ill or aged
widow, or when higher taxes or inflation had rendered the income of
the trust insufficient for her maintenance, he would probably have
provided otherwise than he did. In the absence of a statute granting
this extraordinary power to' a court, or of an express power of in-
vasion, it does not seem to this reviewer that a judge has the power
to exchange his robes of black- for Lincoln green, and to take from
the remaindermen and give to the income beneficiary The doctrine
of deviation does not justify the court in playing favorites, even
though in certain cases the dead hand would probably applaud.29
In McAfee v. Thomas,30 the Supreme Court of Oregon forthrightly
approved deviation from the distributive terms of a trust. The testator
died in 1906, leaving a will which provided in part as follows:
I give, devise and bequeath to my son George C. Litchenthaler, for
his natural life only,'all the net income derived from my property,
real, personal, and nnxed, hereby to that end transferring the same to
George H. Thomas as trustee for said George C. Litchenthaler with
25 Id. at 25-28, 56 A.2d at 643-44.
26 ScoTr, TnusTs (2d ed. 1956).
27 2 Id. § 168, at 1190-91.
2832 N.Y.U.L. REv. 886 (1957).
29 1d. at 892-93.
80 121 Ore. 351, 255 Bac. 333 (1927).
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full power to manage, control and secure an income from said prop-
erty in any manner he may deem proper paying the same as it ac-
crues, to or for the support and maintenance of my son as he may
deem proper paying the same as it accrues, to or for the support and
maintenance of my son as he may deem advisable 31
There was a gift over on the son's death in trust for a charity The
son was an epileptic at the time of bis father's death and was unable
to care for himself. The trustee cared for the son as his father had, and
used the entire trust corpus for this purpose except 384 dollars. The
corpus originally amounted to about 2000 dollars in cash, several par-
cels of real estate which produced an income of about 500 dollars per
year, and a mining interest which turned out to have virtually no
value. The income from the real estate declined over the years. The
son died in 1919, thirteeh years after hIs father's death. It appeared
that had the real estate and mining interests produced the anticipated
revenue there would have been adequate income to care for the epi-
leptic son.
The trustees for the charity in remainder brought suit against the
trustee for the son for the principal which was consumed. The Su-
preme Court of Oregon, reversing the trial court's judgment for the
plaintiffs, approved the trustee's use of principal for the care of the
testator's son, stating:
Where the conditions of the estate changed from what the testator
had in contemplation, and the income was no longer sufficient to care
for the purposes designated in the trust, the court will so change the
terms of the will as to effect as nearly as possible the intention of the
testator
In cases of extreme urgency the court will allow maintenance for
the infant out of the capital fund; even- when inconsistent with the
disposition made by the testator.3, -
Comment d of section 168 of the Restatement of Trusts, Second,
supports the holding of the Wolcott and McAfee cases. Comment d
reads in part:
The court will not permit or direct the application of the principal
to the support or education of one beneficiary where by the terms of
the trust income only is to be applied, if the result would be to de-
prive another beneficiary of property to which he is or may become
entitled by the terms of the trust, whether the interest of such other
beneficiary is vested or contingent, unless such other beneficiary con-
sents to such application.
?1 Id. at 353, 255 Pac. at 334.
44 Id. at 358, 255 Pac. at 336.
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Even though there is a gift over on the death of the beneficiary,
the court will authorize or direct an invasion of the principal for the
necessary support of the beneficiary where the will indicates that the
support of the beneficiary was the primary purpose of the testator,
even though the testator did not in express terms permit the invasion
of the principal.
Illustration:
5. A bequeaths his property to B in trust to pay the income to his
widow and on her death to divide the principal among his issue then
living. Owing to a subsequent decrease in the amount of the income
and to the increased cost of living, the income is msufficient for the
support of the widow. The court may permit the use of pnncipal for
the widow's support if it finds that the support of the widow was the
testators primary purpose in creating the trust.33
In 1965 New York enacted legislation authorizing the court to
order deviation from distributive terms of trusts thereafter created if
the circumstances indicated that such deviation would be more m
keeping with the donor's "intent"
3
s RESTATEmNT (SEcoND), TRUSTS § 168 (1959).
In the cases of McGill v. Young, 75 N.H. 133, 71 Ad. 637 (1908), and Longwith v.
Riggs, 123 IlL. 258, 14 N.E. 840 (1887), the courts allowed the invasion of prncipal
where the trust instrument provided expressly for "support" out of income and the in-
come was inadequate. See also Hardy v. Bankers Trust Co., 137 NJ. Eq. 352, 44 A.2d
839 (1945).
Some courts have shown considerable flexibility in cases where the trust provided
for an annuity of a specific amount to be paid out of income, and the income subse-
quently became inadequate. In allowing the invasion of principal to pay annuity, courts
have stated that the prumary, purpose was the payment of the annuity, and the source
was not a limitation upon. its payment. See Estate of Emerson, 139 Cal. App. 571, 34
P.2d 800 (193.4) Mitchell v. Wyckoff, 122 Con. 48, 186 AU. 709. (1936); Schloesser v.
Scloesser, 3 29 Ill. App. 604, 70 N.E.2d 346 (1946); Brown v. Berry, 71 N.H. 241,
52 AtL 870 f 1902); In Re Rosenberg's Will, 110 N.Y.S.2d 573 (Surr. Ct. 1952).
Other courts have deied the invasion of corpus where the income was inadequate
to pay the annuity. See Estate of Markham, 28 Cal. 2d 69, 168 P.2d'669 (1946); Ein-
becker v. Einbecker, 162 Ill. 267, 44 N.E. 426 (1896); Wight v. Mason, 134 Me. 52,
180 Ad. 917 (1935); Lynn Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Martin, 308 Mass. 443, 32
N.E.2d 247 (1941); In Re Trusteeship- under Will of Whelan, 263 Minn. 476, 116
N.W.2d 811 (1962); Kearnes v. Gray, 173 N.C. 555, 92 S.E. 606 (1917); Dwight
Estate, 389 Pa. 520, 134 A.2d 45 (1957); 2 Sco-rr, TRUsTs § 128.7 (2d ed. 1956).
For an extended discussion of the annuity question, see Annot., 136 A.L.R. 69
(1942).
Obviously the court can more easily authorize or direct an invasion of corpus where
an annuity is involved than where the income as such is to be paid.
If the obstacle to invasion of corpus is a remote contingent interest of a non-con-
senting or unborn remainderman, the solution may be a bond to protect the holder of
such contingent interest. Clearly this is not a realistic. answer to the distributive deviation
question generally, but it may be feasible in certain situations, See 2 Scorr, TnusTs-
§ 168, at 1188 (2d ed. 1956).
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Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, the court
having jurisdiction of a trust hereafter created or declared to receive
the income of personal property and to apply it to the use of any per-
son, may, unless otherwise provided by such will, deed or other in-
strument, m its discretion make an allowance from principal to any
person who is an income beneficiary whose support or education is
not sufficiently provided for by the trust or otherwise, whether or not
such person is entitled to the principal of the trust property or any
part thereof, provided that the court, upon notice to all those benefi-
cially interested in the trust, after hearing, is satisfied that the orig-
inal purpose of the settlor or testator cannot be carried out and that
such allowance more nearly expresses the intention of the settlor or
testator3 4
Pennsylvania enacted legislation in 1947 authorizing the court to
order deviation from the distributive terms of a trust within specific
monetary limits and for the benefit of a limited group of persons. The
statute, as amended in 1956, is as follows:
Failure of original purpose. The court having jurisdiction .of a
trust, heretofore or hereafter created, regardless of any spendthrift or
similar provision therein, in its discretion may terminate such trust in
whole or in part, or make an allowance from prncipal to a conveyor,
his spouse, issue, parents, or any of them, who is an income benefi-
ciary, provided the court after hearing is satisfied that the original
purpose of the conveyor cannot be carried out or is impractical of
fulfillment, and that the termination, partial termination, or allowance
more nearly approximates the intention of the conveyor, and notice
is given to all parties in interest or to their duly appointed fiduciaries.
But, distributions of principal under this section, whether by termina-
tion, partial termination or allowance, shall not exceed an aggregate
value of twenty-five thousand dollars from all trusts created by the
same conveyor.3 5
It should be noted that this statute applies to trusts created at any
time, which provision was added to the statute by the 1956 amend-
ment. The original 1947 legislation wassprospective in application. 8
The question of the invasion of principal pursuant to the provisions of
the statute has been litigated.37
New York also has a statute which has been construed to empower
34 N.Y. PERs. Piop. LAw § 15-a(2) (McKinney 1962). There is a sunilar provislon
applicable to real property. N.Y. REAL PRoERTY LAw § 103-a (McKinney Supp. 1966).
35 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 301.2(a) (1950).
36 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 301.21 (1950). See Bosler Estate, 378 Pa. 333, 107 A.2d
443 (1954).
37 See Miller Estate, 27 Pa. D. & C.2d 239 (1963); Cheston's Estate, 26 Pa. D. &
C.2d 61 (1961); Ryan Estate, 24 Pa. D. & C.2d 41, aff'd, 404 Pa. 229, 172 A.2d 584
(1961).
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [VOL 18
DISTRIBUTIVE DEVIATION IN TRUSTS
a court to change substantially the terms of a trust under certain
limited circumstances. The statute reads in part:
When a person, for whose benefit a valid accumulation of the in-
come of personal property has been directed, shall be destitute of
other sufficient means of support or education, the supreme court, at
special term in any case, or, if such accumulation shall have been
directed by a will, the surrogate's court of the county in which such
will shall have been admitted to probate, may, on the application of
such person or Ins guardian or committee, cause a suitable sum to be
taken from the moneys accumulated or directed to be accumulated,
to be applied for the support or education of such person.88
Although this statute does not provide that the accumulated funds
may be applied if there is a contingent interest in the funds in another
person in the event the person for whom the accumulation is pre-
sumably being made dies prior to attainment of a certain age, several
cases have construed it to authorize such application.8
It should be stressed that the statutes and cases which have al-
lowed deviation from the distributive terms of a trust to the detriment
of the holders of other interests, have done so employing the rationale
of effectuating the intention of the testator or settlor, which transcends
the specific words of the dispositive instrument.4 0 The justification for
avoiding the specific terms is that what is being authorized is what the
testator would have provided if had he anticipated the circumstances
which have developed subsequent to the creation of the trust.
It follows that if the testator states in the will that his explicit pro-
visions for distribution of income and principal are to control at all
times, and that the principal of the trust is never to be invaded to
supplement the income of the life beneficiary, deviation from the dis-
tributive terms is not permissible. If intent, however fictitious, is to be
the rationalizing principle, then logically there can be no other result.
38 N.Y. PEBs. PaO. LAw § 17(1) (McKinney 1962). There is a sunilar provision
applicable to real property. N.Y. REAL PRoP. LAw § 62 (McKinney 1945).
30 Matter of Wagner, 81 App. Div. 163, 80 N.Y.S. 785 (1903); In the Matter of
Davis, 26 Misc. 2d 1077, 202 N.Y.S.2d 106 (Sup. Ct. 1960); In the Matter of Estate
of Breidner, 203 Misc. 78, 113 N.Y.S.2d 398 (Surr. Ct. 1952).
N.Y. Pzas. PROP. LAw § 23 (McKinney 1962), and N.Y. REAL PROP. LAw § 118
(McKinney 1945), provide for the revocation of irrevocable trusts by settlor with con-
sent of beneficiaries, and this has been construed to permit revocation despite the inter-
ests of unborn remamdermen. See in the Matter of Peabody, 5 N.Y.2d 541, 158 N.E.2d
841, 186 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1959); Smith v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 287 N.Y. 500,
41 N.E.2d 72 (1942).40 An exception is the New-York statute dealing with accumulations for minors,
quoted on page 282 supra. Even there, however, a donor could probably prevent the
premature application of accumulated income by clear language prohibiting such action.
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Herein lies the weakness of this fictitious intent rationale. It is sub-
mitted that realistically the issue is, or at least should be, the value of
dead hand control as against the value of protecting individuals to
whom the testator was responsible or felt responsible. In reaching a
judgment an important factor is obviously the nature and need of the
holder of the interest that is being impaired. All relevant factors
should be considered, and an intelligent balance struck, without re-
sort to the fiction of intent.41
Judicial Discretion and Property Rights
The notion that distributive terms of a trust are not to be tampered
with by a court should be subjected to further examination by courts
and legislatures. As with every legal proposition, it must be justified
in terms of its social utility There can be no doubt that the power of
disposition is subject fully to state regulation,42 and, in fact, has been
limited in furtherance of social policies which are considered of greater
importance than freedom of disposition. Restraints for the purpose of
family protection, -and perpetuities restraints, constitute the principal
examples. 43
Limitations upon the freedom of disposition which, in theory, are
objectively determinable and do not require any exercise of judicial
discretion, such as dower, the spouse's forced share, and the Rule
Against Perpetuities, are accepted in the law of succession. But with
certain notable exceptions discussed below, legislatures and courts
-have avoided-the-express use of judicial discretion to resolve private
dispositive problems, although, of course, it is recognized that con-
structional questions frequently involve the exercise of judicial dis-
cretion disguised in terms of discovery of intent. Certainly the equitable
41 The holder of the future interest m most instances is a donee. If, however, he
has paid for his interest with substantial equivalence of its value, this would certainly
preclude impairment of his interest. It would seem that a purchaser from a donee would
stand in no better position than the donee. If the future interest holder is a donee who
has relied in a substantial way upon the realization of his interest, this certainly would
militate against deviation. 4
The English Trustee Act of 1925 (15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 19, § 32) provides that a
trustee in ls discretion may distribute up to one-half the principal to which a future
interest holder may be entitled to such future interest holder, whether or not such inter-
est is contingent or subject to divestment, provided that the consent of holders of prior
life interests are obtained. This is, of course, quite different from the distribution of
principal to an income beneficiary, but it is a form of deviation which can sigificantly
impair the property interests of others in the principal.
42 See Irving Trust Co. v. Day, 314 U.S. 556 (1942).
43 See notes 3 and 13 supra and accompanying text.
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adjustment of trust provisions to avoid hardship to beneficiaries, often
inadvertently imposed by the testamentary hand, is a goal which has
social utility In view of the vast variety of situations which can arise,
judicial discretion is the only means by which it can be done effec-
tively
It is significant that the exercise of judicial discretion to adjust
property rights in order to achieve a socially desirable end has been
expressly recognized in other contexts. Probably the outstanding ex-
ample is the doctrine of cy pres as applied to charitable trusts.44 In
essence, this doctrine provides that if it ceases to be feasible or mean-
mghil to maintain a charitable trust in accordance with its express
terms, the court in its discretion may order the application of the trust
funds to a smilar or related charitable purpose, in trust or otherwise.
The effect of such an order is to keep the funds in charitable channels
and to divert the funds from private hands by way of resulting trust.
Realistically, the decision to apply cy pres and the determination of
the substituted charitable recipient of the funds is discretionary with
the court. The rationale for the doctrine is that the testator would have
wanted the funds to be applied to another charitable purpose in the
event the original charitable purpose has been accomplished or it
ceased to be feasible to maintain the trust for such purpose, rather than
to have the funds pass into private hands.45 Obviously this is another
example of the disingenuous use of "intent" to maintain the illusion
that what the court is doing is enforcing testamentary volition. In fact
what is done is that the court is making the judgment that under the
circumstances it is socially more desirable to direct the use of funds
to a charitable end than to direct the payment of the funds to residuary
legatees or heirs. It is significant that the doctrine of cy pres is theoreti-
cally constructional; that is, the court may determine that the testator
"intended" that the funds pass into private hands if the express chari-
table purpose ceased to be practicable.46
There can be no doubt that the doctrine of cy pres with respect to
charitable trusts involves the discretionary application of funds to a
44 See BocEnT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES §§ 431-42 (2d ed. 1960); 4 ScoTT, TRUsTs
§§ 395-401 (2d ed. 1956).
45 See Jackson v. Phillips, 96 Mass. (14 Allen) 539 (1867); Thatcher v. Lewis, 335
Mo. 1130, 76 S.W.2d 677 (1934); In the Matter of Scott, 8 N.Y.2d 419, 171 N.E.2d
326, 208 N.Y.S.2d 984 (1960). Charitable cy pres is statutory m a number of juns-
dictions.
46 See In the Matter of Syracuse Umv., 3 N.Y.2d 665, 148 N.E.2d 671, 171 N.Y.S.2d
545 (1958); Industrial Natl Bank v. Drysdale, 83 R.I. 172, 114 A.2d 191 (1955).
Gifts to charitable corporations for specified purposes are also subject to the cy pres
principle.
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charitable purpose in derogation of the rights of private claimants.
The result seems desirable, and no one is shocked by it. But then,
charitable cy pres has been sanctioned by time and precedent.4r
Several legislatures" and courts49 have recognized the appropriate-
ness of judicial discretion to adjust dispositive provisions in order to
save a future interest from destruction by the Rule Against Perpetu-
ities. The rule provides that if a future interest is to be valid it must
in all events vest, if it vests at all, within a life in being at the time of
the creation of the interest, plus twenty-one years thereafter. This is
not to say that it is essential to validity that it in fact must vest, but
rather that if vesting should occur, it must under all circumstances do
so within the time limit imposed by the rule. There is also the sub-rule
that in the case of a future interest in a class, the entire class gift fails
if the interest of any one member of the class, or potential member,
may vest too remotely Traditionally, the consequence of a violation
of the rule is the total excision of the future interest from the dis-
positive scheme, usually causing a reversion to heirs or residuary
legatees. 50 The judicial and statutory innovation, which is sometimes
47 In England there is recognized a form of cy pres which is not rationalized on
the basis of donor's intent; this is the so-called prerogative cy pres. Under this doctrine,
the Crown disposes of property left for a purpose which is illegal but which would be
charitable except for the illegality, such as the promotion of Judaism or Roman Catholi-
cism in former times, and property left for charity without specifying the nature of the
charity or indicating that a trust was to be established. Prerogative cy pres is not part
of American law, and apparently is of limited significance in British law today. The
cy pres discussed in the text is sometimes referred to as judicial cy pres to distinguish it
from prerogative ey pres.
48 CAL. Cry. CODE § 715.5; IDnl o CODE ANN. § 55-111 (1957); Ky. REV. STAT.
§ 381.216 (1962); VT. STAT. ANNr. tit. 27, § 501 (1959). Massachusetts, Connecticut,
Maine, Maryland, and New York have legislated perpetuities cy pres limited to the re-
duction of age contingencies. The Vermont statute is an example of broad, discretionary
cy pres: "Any interest in real or personal property which would violate the rule against
perpetuities shall be reformed, within the limits of that rule, to approximate most closely
the intention of the creator of the interest. In determining whether an interest would
violate said rule and in reforming an interest the period of perpetuities shall be mea-
sured by actudl rather than possible events." VT. STAT. ArNr. tit. 72, § 541 (1957).
Most of the jurisdictions which have legislated perpetuities cy pres have also
adopted some form of the "wait-and-see" perpetuities reform. See BEniN & HASEEL,
PpEFACE TO ESTATES iN LAiD Am FUTuaE INTEBEsTS 218-23 (1966).
49The Supreme Court of New Hampshire in Edgerly v. Barker, 66 N.H. 434, 31
AtI. 900 (1891), and the Supreme Court of Mississippi in Carter v. Berry, 243 Miss.
321, 140 So. 2d 843 (1962), reduced the age contingencies in future interests in order
to bring them within the Rule Against Perpetuities, without benefit of legislative autho-
rization. It is not clear, of course, that such courts would go further and modify dis-
positive terms more substantially if necessary, but there is no indication in the opinions
that the courts consider their cy pres power limited to the reduction of age contingencies.
50 For discussions of the operation of the Rule Against Perpetuities, see 6 AmmucAwr
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called the cy pres reform, enables the court to change the disposition
so as to make it comply with the Rule Against Perpetuities. In some
instances, the manner of saving the future interest will be mechanical;
judicial discretion will not be seriously involved.51 But there are situ-
ations which can be hypothesized in which several alternative revisions
of the dispositive plan will be reasonably available to the court; here
judicial discretion will be involved.5 2
The so-called "ey pres" reform in perpetuities law is another in-
stance in which judicial discretion is used to. adjust property rights.
The rationale is that the testator would have preferred that the future
interest be reformed than that it wholly fail.53 The justification for
judicial discretion is the social value of fulfillment of the property
owner's dispositive purpose, albeit in somewhat altered form.
Judicial discretion has been introduced into sales law by the Urn-
form Commercial Code. Under the terms of section 2-302, the court
may refuse to enforce any term of a contract for the sale of goods if it
determines that such clause is unconscionable, or it may refuse to en-
force the contract as a whole if it contains an unconscionable clause,
or it may limit the applicability of the unconscionable clause.5" With-
LA.w OF PRaOPERTY §§ 24.1-.68 (Casner ed. 1952); BERGiN & HAsrLL, PREFACE TO
ESTATES IN LaD Am FuTiu INTmERESTS 183-229 (1966); Smrs & SMrr, FurtuRE
INTERESTS §§ 1201468 (2d ed. 1956),
51 This refers to the reduction of the age contingency. Testator bequeaths in trust
to pay the income to A for life, remainder to the children of A who live to age twenty-
five. A survives the testator. The reduction of the age contingency from twenty-five to
twenty-one saves the future interest in the children of A.
52 A testamentary trust provides for the income to A for life, then income to the
children of A for their lives, and upon .the death of the survivor of A's children, prin-
cipal over to the issue of A per stirpes. A is alive at the testator's death and has two
children at that time. The remainder to issue is invalid under the comman law Rule
Against Perpetuities. The remainder could be saved by reforming the trust to provide
that in any event (a) the trust is to terminate and the corpus be distributed to the issue
of A per stirpes not later than twenty-one years after the death of the survivor of A
and the two children of A who were alive at the testator's death, or alternatively (b)
the issue of A who are to receive the principal are to be determined and their remainder
interests to be vested not later than twenty-one years after the death. of A and the two
children of A who were alive at the testator's death, the trust continuing until the death
of the survivor of As children. See BEaGIN & HAsEEL, PREFACE To ESTATES IN LAND
Am FuTuRE INTEREsTs 220-23 (1966); Browder, Construction, Reformation, and the
Rule Against Perpetuities, 62 MIcH. L. REV. 1 (1963).
53 The broad cy pres statutes cited in note 46 supra expressly provide that the re-
formation of thefuture interest is to approximate as closely as possible the donor's intent
within the limits of the rule.
5 4 UmNroin CoMmamcIAL CODE § 2-302 provides:
"(1) If the court as a matter of law .finds' the contract or any. clause of the contract
to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the -court may refuse to enforce
the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable
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out such legislation, only courts of equity were said to have the power
to refuse to enforce an unconscionable contract or term thereof;5 the
court of law was supposedly not empowered to pass judgment on the
ethical quality of the contract.5 6 Of course, courts have used construe-
tional devices to avoid harsh consequences of overbearing termsST
Section 2-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code constitutes a forth-
right grant of judicial power to change a contract m the interest of
maintaining ethical commercial standards. This legislation authorizes
the court to adjust valuable interests agreed to by the parties, how-
ever unequal their bargaining positions,58 on the basis of a standard
which is incapable of anything approaching precision of definition.
Where a testator creates a legal life estate in land, with remainder
over, the divided-Qwnership may cause serious problems if it becomes
desirable to sell. Obviously there is no market for the life interest
alone, and usually none for less than the fee interest in the entire prop-
erty Thus, if the land becomes unproductive or underproductive, and
the remaindermen, or any one of them, do not want to sell, the life
tenant may suffer hardship unless there is some judicial power to
order a sale of the fee. Courts of equity have ordered sales of the fee
interest where all interest holders have not voluntarily joined in the
conveyance of the fee, under appropriately compelling circum-
stances;"9 and there is legislation in a number of states specifically
clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any
unconscionable result.
"(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any clause
thereof may -be unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity
to present evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose and effect-to aid the court in
making the determination." I ,
55 See. Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80 (3d Cir. 1948).
56 See Athe dissent of Judge Jerome Frank im Siegelman v. Cunard White Star, 221
F.2d 189, 199 (2d Cr. 1955).
57See the Official Comment to § 2-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code citing and
describing ten cases in which "construction" was employed to avoid the harsh conse-
quences of certain contractual terms.
M8Unconscionability is likely to appear in the form contract provided by a large
corporation, the terms of which are not subject to negotiation or bargaining. The situ-
ation is further aggravated when the weak party can obtain no better terms from com-
petitors. These contracts have come to be known as "contracts of adhesion." The "take
it or leave it" aspect of such contracts raises the question of whether the law should
apply traditional contract principles to them. See Hennmingsen v. Bloomfield Motors Inc.,
32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960); Ehrenzweig, Adhesion Contracts in the Conflict of
Laws, 53 CoLum. L. Rnv. 1072 (1953); Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts
About Freedom of Contract, 43 CoLum. L. R v. 629 (1943); Lenhoff, Contracts of Ad-
heswon and the Freedom of Contract: A Comparative Study in the Light of American
and Foreign Law, 36 Tui. L. REv. 481 (1962).
59 See ..Christopher v. Chadwick, 223 Ala. 260, 135. So. 454 (1931); Bedford v.
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empowering courts to accomplish this result.60 This judicial action in-
volves discretionary adjustment of property interests of a qualitative
nature, but not of a quantitative nature. That is to say, the court
changes the form of the property by authorizing the sale of the fee,
and the reinvestment of the proceeds, but the life and remainder in-
terests are not changed in the sense that anything is taken from one
and given to the other. This judicial power is similar to that of dis-
cretionary deviation from administrative provisions of trusts, such as
investment limitations, where the settlor's injunctions are changed by
the court but the beneficial interests in the corpus are not otherwise
affected. 1
In various British Commonwealth countries during this century,
legislation has been enacted empowering the court to, change testa-
mentary terms if in the judgment of the court the testamentary pro-
visions for the surviving spouse or minor children are inadequate for
proper maintenance and support.62 The judicially directed provision
for family may be in the form of periodic payments or a lump sum
payment. Thus, instead of imposing arbitrary, objective restraints, as
in the case of dower and the surviving spouse forced share legislation
in this country, and the community property and l6gitime of the civil
law systems s3 these countries have adopted a flexible system of testa-
mentary restraint. The court is given the power to change dispositive
terms in order to effect the social purpose of post-mortem family sup-
port. The social value of adequate financial provision for family is
given priority over the freedom of testamentary disposition.
The British- Commonwealth legislation probably is the closest.
analogy to the principle of discretionary distributive deviation in
"Bedfqrd, 105 Ark. 587, 152 S.W 129 (1912); Cagle v. Schaefer, 115,S.C. 35, 104 S.E.
321 .(1920); 1 AMERIcAx LAw OF Por EnT § 4.98 (Casner ed. 1952); 2 PowELL,
REAL PnopEnia 292 (1966).
6 0 CAL. CODE Crv. PRoc. § 752; IND. ANN . STAT. § 3-2426 (Bums 1946); Ky. RiEv.
STAT. § 389.030 (1962). See 1 ANmZCAN LAw OF PNoPEurY § 4.99 (Casner ed. 1952);
2 Powrie, Rm. PNorEn 292-9 (1966).
61 See notes 7 & 8 supra and accompanying text.
( 2 See MAcDoNALD, FRAuD oN Tim Wmow's Smau 290-98 (1960); Damow, Re-
strtated Testation in New Zealand, Australia and Canada, 36 MicH. L. REv. 1107
(1938); Haskell, The Power of Dittniheritance: Proposal for Reform, 52 GEo. L.J. 499,
516-17 (1964).
3The 16gitime is a form of forced heirship on behalf of descendants and parents
of the property owner which obtains in the civil law systems of Europe and in Louisi-
ana. See MAcDONALD, op. cit. supra note 60, at 281-89; Haskell, supra note 62, at 517-
18; McMurray, Liberty of Testation and Some Modern Limitations Thereon, 14 ILi.. L.
Rnv. 94 (1919).
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trusts. The British legislation appears to have worked well.64 This,
however, is discretionary judicial power for the protection of family,
a traditional area of judicial and legislative concern. Judicial discretion
to adjust income and principal provisions of trusts to relieve hardship,
on the other hand, is not limited to family protection, although, of
course, close family would frequently be the objects of such discre-
tionary protection. Nevertheless, the success of the British legislation
indicates that broad judicial discretion can operate effectively in the
adjustment of property .nghts where avoidance of hardship is the
criterion.
We have been considering areas of the law which, in the form of
express rules, offer analogical support for the adoption of discretionary
distributive deviation in trusts. But discretion is probably always with
us, in every dispute in tort, contract, property, trade regulation, or
constitutional rights, which is worth the time and money to litigate.
Judicial discretion is involved in determining whether or not a deed
provides for a right of entry or possibility of reverter, whether for per-
petuities purposes a testator intended a future interest in a class to
include after-born members, whether a merger of large industrial
concerns constitutes an anti-trust violation, whether zoning action is
arbitrary, whether separate but equal facilities for Negroes constitutes
a violation of the fourteenth amendment. In every real factual dispute,
at least two conclusions can reasonably be arrived at;65 on any set of
given facts producing a genuine legal dispute, at least one legal or
interpretational principle is available- to rationalize credibly each
side's position. 6 Discretion thoughtfully exercised on the basis of
sociological, economic and ethical considerations is the stuff of judicial
decision; this is a fact known to the bar and the bench, albeit seldom
expressly conceded. It seems to be part of our tradition to ignore this
phenomenon, for ,fear presumably that the admission, will compromise
the proverbial objectivity and certainty of the law But it-is this judi-
cial discretion which provides the growth factor in our common law
system and has made it viable, and which allows for that individualized
legal result which rules cannot provide.17
64 See Laufer, Flexible Restraints on Testamentary Freedom-A Report on Dece-
dents' Family Maintenance Legislation; 69 HAzv. L. REv. 277 (1955).
65 See FRAN, LAw AND = MoDE N MsnD 100-17, 170-85 (1930); Holmes, Path
of the Law, 10 HARv. L., REv. 457, 465-66' (1897).
66 See CAnnozo, THE GROWTt or THE LAw 56-80 (1924); DAwsoN, UNJUST EN-
.*icwvrENT 25 (1951); Lz wEIYI, BBAwmiI BUSH 41-69 (1951); Llewellyn, Sympo-
stum on Law and The Modern Mind, 31 COLUM. L. Rv.. 82 (1931).
67 See also F IETcm, SrrUATION ETHmcs (1966). In thls mteresting book, a pro-
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The thrust of this article is to suggest that the principle of devi-
ation from the distributive terms of a trust should be more generally
adopted, whether by legislation or judicial action. Clearly this prm-
ciple can only be implemented through the exercise of judicial dis-
cretion. Unlike family protection and restraints upon perpetuities,
objective criteria would be wholly inadequate to achieve the ends
which distributive deviation should serve. This is not to suggest that
objective criteria are the best means to further the goals of family
protection or perpetuites control,"' but rather to stress that decision-
making with respect to distributive deviation is a more complex evalu-
ative process and would likely involve a greater variety of situations
than family protection or perpetuities control.
But the question may be asked why the principle of distributive
deviation should not be applied to all testamentary provisions if it is
recognized in the field of trusts. If it is applied generally to dispositive
instruments, what stability can there be m the dispositive aspect of
private property? It may be said that if the court can change one's
bequest of 5000 dollars to cousin Jenme, then the power of disposition
exists by grace of the court.
Probably the best response to this "all or nothing" type of argu-
ment is that change, or, if you will, progress, is an ad hoc process, and
it is not necessary to carry an innovation beyond the limits of sound
social policy The taking of one step which appears to make sense
does not require the taking of another related step if that does not
seem to be socially desirable. But more specifically, the creation of
trusts is an extension of the dead hand into the future where needs
and circumstances cannot be predicted. Discretionary power to au-
thorize deviation is, therefore, more justifiable here than in the case
of the immediate testamentary gift where the property owner can
more effectively relate his giving to the circumstances of his donees.
Lessor of social ethics at an Episcopal seminary describes the inadequacy of the legalistic
approach to moral decision-making. In view of the distinctive factors present in the
individual moral problem, rules frequently do not provide a satisfactory answer; any
attempt to formulate rules for the multifanous factual possibilities produces a verbal
and logical complex whlih only obfuscates the goal of the moral decision. Professor
Fletcher advocates a situational approach whereby the moral decision is determined in
accordance with the peculiar qualities present in the particular case, the moral rules
serving as guides rather than determinants. Professor Fletcher's analysis has considerable
analogical significance for the law.
68 The use of objective criteria for family protection has been criticized by the late
professor Edmond Cah in hs article, "°Restraints on Disinheritance," 85 U. PA. L. REv.
139 (1936), and by Professor William MacDonald in his fine work, Fraud on the
Widot's Share (1960).
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Thus it appears that distributive deviation in trusts can be supported
without substantially npairing the stability of the dispositive power.
As previously discussed, the legislatures and the courts which have
adopted the principle of distributive deviation have done so on the
ground of a dispositive intent which transcends the specific words of
the will; the court directs what the testator would have done had he
foreseen the circumstances which have arisen. This rationale offers
continuity with precedent and conventional jurisprudence on behalf
of a novel doctrine. It may well be that our law culture requires this,
but it is suggested that this reasoning, premised on a fiction, obfuscates
the true purpose of distributive deviation. The function of distributive
deviation is to place another reasonable limit upon the dispositive
power; it should not be a constructional principle but rather a social
policy If it is viewed as merely a constructional principle, then its
effect can be defeated by a clause in a will which provides that under
no circumstances are the income-principal divisions to be altered.69
The legislatures and courts which have recognized distributive de-
viation have done so to the extent of allowing the application of prin-
cipal for the benefit of an income beneficiary 70 But if this is allowed,
what is to prevent the court from directing that the income be paid to
a remamnderman in need during the life of the income beneficiary
whose financial situation is quite satisfactory without the trust income?
If distributive deviation is accepted in principle, tlns does not seem to
be an unreasonable application under appropriate circumstances; an
extension of the principle to this situation is not unlikely But what
about the application of the principle for the purpose of benefiting
someone in need who is not a beneficiary under the trust but who is
a family member, at the expense of a beneficiary who is financially
secure independently of the trust provision for him? Would such an
extension be reasonable? Obviously this would be rather extreme.
There is a policy of family protection which has been legislated, how-
ever inadequately, 71 and the application of trust property to non-
beneficiaries would seem to involve that policy It is suggested that a
consideration of this kind brings up the issue of the adequacy of
69 The statutory authorization in New York for invasion of corpus explicitly so
states. See note 31 supra and accompanying text.
70 See notes 23, 30, 34 and 35 supra and accompanying text.
71 The inadequacies have been discussed in the following books and articles: MAc-
DoNAiz, FRAUD ON i Wmow's Sn m (1960),- Sims, PxmLc Pocy AND TM DzA
HAND (1955); Calm, Restraints on Disinheritance, 85 U. PA. L. REv. 139 (1936);
Haskell, The Power of Disinheritance: Proposal for Reform, 52 GEo. L.J. 499 (1964);
Spies, Property Rights of the Surviving Spouse, 46 VA. L. REv. 157 (1960).
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family protection legislation and, as such, should not be taken up in
connection with the principle of distributive deviation.
A final matter to be considered is the break with precedent and
the possible disappointment of expectations which the adoption of the
principle of distributive deviation involves. A judicial decision which
overrules precedent usually is retroactive in its effect upon the parties
inasmuch as they presumably-relied upon the state of the law as re-
flected in prior decisions in the managing of their affairs. In the field
of succession law, the consequence may be to defeat the expectation
of a party with respect to the benefit of a quantum of wealth. This is
mitigated somewhat by the fact that the expectation usually is in the
nature of a wmdfall in any event. As for the disappointment of the
expectation of the donor, this is somewhat fictitious since he is usually
dead at the time the dispositive terms are adjusted. There can be no
serious constitutional objection raised on the ground of retroactivity
as far as judicial decisions involving property interests are concerned.72
Nevertheless, if it is felt that the retroactive effect of the adoption
of the principle of distributive deviation is undesirable, it is suggested
that the principle be adopted by the process of prospective overruling.
If the issue is presented to a court, it may decline to disturb the dis-
positive provisions of the trust in litigation, but announce that as to
trusts thereafter created, the court will recognize the principle. This
would have the same effect as legislation which provides that it is to be
applicable only with respect to future transactions. Although the prin-
ciple of prospective overruling has not been widely adopted by state
courts, there is substantial precedent and support for it.7 3
It is to be noted that the New York legislation authorizing dis-
tributive deviation is only prospective in application, 4 whereas the
Pennsylvania legislation is expressly made retroactive. 5 It is unlikely
that a constitutional objection to legislative retroactivity in this area
72 See Note, Prospective Overruling and Retroactive Application in the Federal
Courts, 71 YALE L.J. 907, 909-10 (1961) and cases cited thereto.
73See I DAvis, AmIvN-sRAarIvE LAw TREA iSE § 5.09, at 352 (1958); HAnT &
SAcGs, THE LEcAL PInoCss: BASic PROBLEMS IN T MAXING AN APPLICATION OF
LA.w 620-37 (Tent. ed. 1958); lB MooRE, FEERnAL PaACTICE 178-201 (2d ed. 1965);
Levy, Realist Jurisprudence and Prospective Overruling, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1960);
Cumer, Time and Change in Judge-Made Law: Prospective Overruling, 51 VA. L. REv.
201 (1965); Note, Prospective Overruling and Retroactive Application in the Federal
Courts, 71 YALE L.J. 907, 916-30 (1961); and cases cited theretn. See also Johnson v.
New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966).
74 See page 281 supra.
75 See page 282 supra.
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would be sustained, particularly where dispositive intention is ex-
pressly made the criterion for the judicial modification of trust terms."6
Conclusion
The power of a court to direct that dispositive term of a trust be
modified where literal adherence would produce hardship has been
recognized by several courts and legislatures. This has been rational-
ized on the basis of a dispositive intent which transcends the specific
dispositive terms employed. It is suggested that this doctrine be more
widely adopted, and that it be rationalized in terms of a limitation
upon the dispositive power on behalf of a valid social policy, rather
than as a constructional principle.
76 See Hochman, The Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Retroactive
Legislation, 73 HAnv. L. REv. 692 (1960).
